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Autonomous Robotics Systems are inherently safety-critical and have com-
plex safety issues to consider (for example, a safety failure can lead to a safety
failure). Before they are deployed, these systems of have to show evidence that
they adhere to a set of regulator-defined rules for safety and security. Formal
methods provide robust approaches to proving a system obeys given rules, but
formalising (usually natural language) rules can prove difficult.
Regulations specifically for autonomous systems are still being developed,
but the safety rules for a human operator are a good starting point when trying
to show that an autonomous system is safe. For applications of autonomous
systems like driverless cars and pilotless aircraft, there are clear rules for human
operators, which have been formalised and used to prove that an autonomous
system obeys some or all of these rules [4, 3]. However, in the space and nuclear
sectors applications are more likely to differ, so a set of general safety principles
has developed. This allows novel applications to be assessed for their safety, but
are difficult to formalise.
To improve this situation, we are collaborating with regulators and the com-
munity in the space and nuclear sectors to develop guidelines for autonomous
and robotic systems that are amenable to robust (formal) verification. These
activities also have the benefit of bridging the gaps in knowledge within both
the space or nuclear communities and academia.
1 Security Regulations in Space
On the 1st of February 2019, we held a Space Security Scoping Workshop which
was jointly organised by the Universities of Liverpool (Marie Farrell and Mi-
chael Fisher) and Warwick (Matthew Bradbury and Carsten Maple). The 29
attendees were from a mix of academia and industry. The aim of this workshop
was to discuss the cyber security issues related to robotic systems deployed in
space in order to scope out research priorities and to develop collaborative R&D
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programmes on the topic of cyber security between FAIR-SPACE and industrial
partners.
Discussions during the workshop revealed that the space industry is becom-
ing more entrepreneurial, with a greater acceptance of risk for more financial
gain. Current regulations and standards for space are lacking and often ignored.
In particular, rules enforced by the European Space Agency (ESA) when launch-
ing satellites can be, and often are, disregarded by other organisations, and so
those that do not meet the ESA’s requirements may still be launched.
During this workshop, the organisers posed the following five questions to
the attendees related to space security.
• What are the security issues in space?
• Are they different to the issues in autonomous ground/air vehicles?
• What will be the problems in the future?
• What are current ways of detecting/stopping attacks in these systems?
• How do environmental considerations impact on security?
From the resulting discussion, it became clear that, although some companies
and organisations have a good understanding of the security issues faced by
their space systems, there are others that have not seriously considered cyber
security. The lack of detailed guidelines and regulations in this area is certainly
a stumbling block which makes it difficult for new space companies to know ex-
actly what is required of their systems from a cyber security perspective. There
are, however, various guidelines for space systems’ security published by the
Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), but it appears that
they are no enforced and are not detailed enough, particularly for autonomous
robotic missions [1].
A full report for this workshop, which describes the discussion of the above
questions in detail, has been published by the FAIR-SPACE hub [2]. The re-
port also outlines our future work in this area, which includes several academic
publications describing how cyber security threat analysis techniques can be
combined with formal verification and some associated case studies. We are
in frequent contact with several attendees from the workshop to ensure that
our research remains relevant for the space industry. Furthermore, we intend to
organise a follow-up workshop in the future, as part of the FAIR-SPACE Hub1.
2 Safety Regulations in the Nuclear Sector
In the UK, regulation of robotics for nuclear industry is more clear cut. The
Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is the government body responsible for
checking the safety of any system operating on the ‘nuclear estate’. While the
ONR provide guidance for ensuring system safety, they have not yet produced
any guidance specific to autonomous systems. Their guides are also more de-
scriptive than prescriptive, which makes them difficult to formalise and use as
a system specification.
1Future AI and Robotics for Space: https://www.fairspacehub.org/
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To tackle this challenge, we have been running a series of workshops2 with
the ONR. The workshops aim to be an open forum for discussion between the
nuclear operators and supply chain, the ONR, and academia. They explore
the safety assessment process for robotic systems in the nuclear industry and
examine what may change with the introduction of autonomy. The main focus
of the workshops is to clarify (if not answer) the questions surrounding the
verification of autonomous robotics.
We have run two workshops, both attended by a mixture of academics, nuc-
lear operators, robotics developers, and representatives from the ONR. The first
workshop introduced the safety assessment process in the UK nuclear industry
and verification approaches for autonomous robotic systems, and concluded with
a broad discussion session. The second workshop focussed on four case studies
of proposed or operational robotic systems from nuclear operators. Two of the
case studies were of laser cutting systems, the other two were for remote hand-
ling or maintenance. After their introduction, each case study was discussed, in
parallel, to examine the hazards and mitigations of the current system and of
the same robotic system if it were under autonomous control.
Several issues were raised during the workshops’ discussion sessions about
the extra considerations needed for the introduction of a robotic system. Firstly,
it was thought that a robotic system could widen the environment of the system,
to cover the transportation and cleaning or maintenance of the robot, and not
just its usual operating facility. There was also recognition that the system
failing can bring a human back into the hazardous environment. This points
to the need for highly reliable (hardware and software) systems, especially if
the system is autonomous and especially if it will be used over a long time
period. Finally, there were worries about the impact of robotic and autonomous
systems on the workforce, both in terms of job availability and lower safety due
to complacency. Both of these issues require careful cross-disciplinary study and
communication.
Crucially for the verification of autonomous robotics, the discussions in both
workshops revealed that there is no standard good practice for developing ro-
botic or autonomous systems in a way that can be robustly verified. So, to
follow up these workshops, we are collaborating with the ONR to develop such
guidelines for autonomous robotic systems in hazardous nuclear environments.
We are currently drafting the guidelines, which will eventually be opened up to
wider consultation. These aim to guide developers to build their systems in ways
that make robust (particularly formal) verification easier. These guidelines have
the secondary aim of describing the merits and methods of forms of verification
that may be new that community.
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